. This knowledge, real or assumed, encourages policymakers to manipulate voting systems to promote equality or reinforce existing disparities within the electorate.
The first goal of this study is to examine what causes states to change their voting procedures. Specifically, we examine the extent to which racial and partisan forces are related to the adoption of photo and nonphoto ID regulations. Does the level of racial diversity within a state affect the adoption of electoral reforms? Does Republican control of state government result in a greater likelihood of adopting new ID laws? If so, how do racial and partisan forces jointly affect the adoption of new rules?
After considering these questions, we study the consequences of voter ID laws. Do these relatively new procedures have the effects that lawmakers assume they do? If some reforms do change patterns of participation, how evenly are these effects spread across racial groups? If laws are the product of racial diversity within the electorate or have effects that differ across racial groups, then there is continued empirical support for the idea that the United States is characterized by a form of two-tiered pluralism resulting from a tradition of ascriptive hierarchy (Hero 1992; Smith 1993) . If, however, the causes and consequences of changes to voting procedures are 514854P RQXXX10.1177/1065912913514854Political Research QuarterlyRocha and Matsubayashi research-article2013 1 University of Iowa, Iowa City, USA 2 Osaka University, Toyonaka, Japan 2 Political Research Quarterly XX (X) unrelated to race, then there is support for the narrative that the United States continues to move toward the attainment of liberal principles.
Race and the Adoption of Electoral Reforms
For decades, scholars have argued that racial forces exert a strong influence on the formation of public policies. This argument is grounded in the power-threat, or backlash, hypothesis (Blalock 1967; Key [1949 Key [ ] 1984 . Residing in the same political jurisdiction as blacks or Latinos appears to make whites less likely to support policies explicitly or implicitly designed to aid those groups (Giles 1977; Glaser 1994; Hood and Morris 1997; Hopkins 2010; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Rocha and Espino 2009) . It also makes whites less likely to vote for minority candidates and shifts partisan identification (Giles and Buckner 1993; Liu 2001; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Wright 1977) . As a result of white backlash, racial diversity has the potential to produce more racially conservative policies. Specific public policy areas that scholars have linked to racial context include civil rights, welfare, health care, education, and immigration/language (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, Hero 1998; Hood and Morris 1997; Matsubayashi and Rocha 2012; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Preuhs 2006; Soss et al., 2001; Yates and Fording 2005) .
A similar argument can be made regarding the relationship between racial context and election rules. American public opinion is characterized by long-standing commitments to protection of individual rights and egalitarian principles (McCloskey and Zaller 1984) . Some scholars have questioned the power of such liberal ideals in explaining the evolution of American politics (Horton 2005; King 1995; Smith 1993 Smith , 1997 . Progress made by egalitarian forces now prevents the use of racist language in mainstream political discourse, but what King and Smith (2005) term antitransformative opposition has relied on an evolving strategy to secure continued patterns of hierarchy in American society. In the past, this has included using liberal values of race-neutrality to support policy regimes that aid inequality in outcomes (Katznelson 2005) . The result can be seen in the belief among some that inequality is the result of differences in values or ethics held by minorities (Kinder and Sanders 1996) . Numerous scholars believe such attitudes to be linked, at least in part, to black or Latino affect (Bobo 2000; Sears 2000) or feelings of closeness to fellow whites (Kinder and Kam 2009) . Empirical work thus suggests that antitransformative forces continue to persist in American politics, but they are now using liberal principals to promote exclusion.
As a possible example, some states have been adopting more stringent voting requirements, which are supposed to be applied universally. These requirements preserve the integrity of the election process, and thereby secure individual voting rights but may actually jeopardize the rights of subgroups such as blacks and Latinos. Two empirical works offer supportive evidence for a linkage between racial context election rules. Hill and Leighley (1999) argue that whites' efforts to demobilize blacks resulted in the adoption of more restrictive registration rules. Similarly, Behrens, Uggen, and Manza (2003) argue that larger nonwhite prison populations lead to states adopting laws that disenfranchise felons. In short, racial diversity may be positively associated with the likelihood of adopting election rules that dissuade minority groups from voting, which fits with the normative concerns raised by Smith (1993) and others.
In contrast, others find that racial diversity produces equality. Yates and Fording (2005) find that the presence of blacks results in less discrimination against blacks within the criminal justice system. Gonzalez-Juneke and Peuhs(2012) show that state legislators become more liberal when representing black and Latino constituents. This is true irrespective of party, a finding that is particularly notable given that blacks fall outside of the reelection constituencies of most Republican lawmakers. Hero and Tolbert (1996; Hero 1999 ) document a consistent relationship between racial diversity and equality in education and health policy outcomes. They argue that this occurs because racial differences in outcomes are framed as violating egalitarian norms in diverse contexts. The long history of racial inequality in diverse context helps to create and sustain what King and Smith (2005) refer to as "egalitarian transformative" orders. These orders note and actively work to remedy such inequities. Antitransformative forces may be weaker in homogeneous context but so are egalitarians. The result is little attention to racial inequality and an unwillingness to use public policy to remedy deviations from the liberal tradition. This stream of literature implies that racial diversity, which the power-threat hypothesis says is tied with interracial hostility, is ultimately associated with equality. When egalitarians come into conflict with those wishing to sustain hierarchy, egalitarians usually win.
We examine whether the adoption of election reforms, such as voter ID laws, can be linked to race. If such a link can be established, does racial diversity produce voting regulations that are more or less restrictive? The arguments outlined above offer reasons for both conclusions. Our focus on ID laws is significant because it links race to fundamental questions about who is eligible to be included within the political process. Policy outcomes are already known to shape the participatory process through feedback effects (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Soss 1999) .
But, if the presence of blacks or Latinos within the electorate results in concrete redefinitions of how easily people can be excluded from civic life, then empirical evidence may affirm concerns that Jim Crow has evolved rather than disappeared.
In sum, the presence of minorities within a state can shift mass and elite attitudes, making the adoption of reforms more likely. It is possible that public opinion moves to encourage efforts aimed at further incorporating minorities into the political process. It is also conceivable that racial diversity results in efforts to suppress minority turnout through changes in election laws in a manner predicted by scholars of American political history and thought.
Partisan Control and Representation
The effect of racial diversity will not likely be constant across all state governments. The racial/ethnic politics literature emphasizes the idea that political parties vary greatly in terms of their sensitivity to minority voices within the electorate (Grose 2011) . Republican control of legislative bodies is generally associated with lower levels of substantive representation for minorities (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Preuhs 2006) . Even so, Republicans who represent minority constituents may fully weigh black and Latino preferences. Lublin (1997) shows that black population size results in more liberal nominate scores for Republican representatives. Yates and Fording's (2005) finding that Republican governments are only linked to inequitable criminal justice policy outcomes in states with few blacks implies the same. These works, in conjunction with others, establish a general pattern showing that large minority constituencies appear to result in greater support for civil rights and social welfare programs across multiple levels of government and various forms of legislative activity (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Eric and Preuhs 2012; Grose 2011; Haynie 2001) .
However, other research is less optimistic about the quality of representation on matters of race, especially when examining roll call votes on what scholars define as black-interest legislation rather than on more general measures of liberalism or conservatism. On such issues, representatives may even be less responsive to blackinterests when their district contains enough blacks to create a threat effect among whites but a number insufficient to allow blacks to determine election outcomes (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Griffin and Newman 2008) . Others find that black population size does not affect the legislative behavior of Republicans in particular (Canon 1999) . Early studies of Latino politics noted a connection between Latino group size and general voting patterns among members of Congress (Welch and Hibbing 1984) . Subsequent research has suggested that threat effects are present (Griffin and Newman 2007; Preuhs 2007) or that there is simply no effect whatsoever (Hero and Tolbert 1995) .
If conservatives are more sympathetic to the arguments poised by antitransformative forces, then Republican control of state government should result in a greater likelihood of adopting voting restrictions. While previous literature generally supports this hypothesis (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Griffin and Newman 2007; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997; Preuhs 2006) , it does not offer clear guidance regarding how the effect of Republican control will differ in diverse and homogeneous states. The presence of minorities may strengthen the influence of antitransformative forces on the Republican Party. The presence of minorities, however, may also strengthen racial egalitarian orders along with antitransformative forces. Because egalitarian arguments can easily connect to liberal principles, diversity may lessen the influence and persuasiveness of those seeking to limit voting rights. Thus, the positive relationship between Republican control and the adoption of restrictive election reforms may be lessened in states with large black and Latino populations. When antitransformative forces and egalitarians duel, egalitarians may win even in Republican circles.
The Racial Consequences of Reform Efforts
The previous discussion assumes a relationship exists between voter ID rules and turnout. It further assumes that this effect varies by race. The belief is strongly suggested in political discourse but lacks a strong empirical basis. Numerous studies have assessed whether and for whom alternative voting procedures make a difference (see Berinsky 2005; Gronke et al. 2008; and Highton 2004 for a review) . Some report that the adoption of new voting methods such as Election Day registration (EDR) have a positive effect on turnout (e.g., Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Burden and Neiheisel 2011; Hanmer 2009 ). Others (e.g., Fitzgerald 2005) maintain that the effects of absentee voting and early in-person voting are statistically indiscernible. Findings are also mixed regarding who is most affected by the election rules (Larocca and Klemanski 2011; Rigby and Springer 2011) .
Similarly, the literature is inconclusive about the extent to which voter ID rules in particular affect voter turnout. While Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (2008) show voter ID rules depress turnout among low socioeconomic individuals, Erikson and Minnite (2009) ; Mycoff, Wagner, and Wilson (2009); and Vercellotti and Anderson (2009) find no evidence that voter ID laws have any clear effect. Additionally, many of these studies do not specifically examine whether blacks and Latinos
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are uniquely affected by voting rules (but see Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz 2008) .
General differences in turnout between minorities and whites have been explained with other individual-level characteristics that are correlated with race as well as with contextual factors (Cassel 2002; Jackson 2003; Leighley 2001; Verba et al. 1993) . Even if ID requirements are enforced in a nondiscriminatory manner, which studies suggest is not the case (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2007; Cobb, Greiner, and Quinn 2012) , minorities are still less likely to possess required forms of identification (Barreto, Nuño, and Sanchez 2007) .
Minority voters benefit from strong race-based civic institutions, which are more likely to be present in communities with large minority populations (Leighley 2001; Rocha and Espino 2010) . Thus, communities with the institutional capacity to help compensate for tougher barriers to participation are similar to those that some believe are more likely to adopt tougher voting regulations during periods of Republican control. This provides a mechanism by which laws whose enactment is at least in part influenced by the desire to preserve a two-tiered pluralistic system may be ineffectual in the end.
Differing findings regarding the effect of voter ID laws also may partly be due to the difference in methodological approaches. Except for the study by Erikson and Minnite (2009) , previous studies rely on a cross-sectional approach comparing rates or probabilities of turnout between states with and without voter ID laws. Most studies typically use cross-state data from a single election or cumulative cross-sectional data from multiple election cycles. As recently summarized by several works (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Burden and Neiheisel 2011; Erikson and Minnite 2009; Hanmer 2009 ), a research design exploiting cross-state variation is not an ideal way to evaluate the causal effect of election rules on voter turnout because it often fails to minimize the possibility of spuriousness. States, of course, differ in demographic and political characteristics in addition to election rules. Because election rules are not randomly adopted, it is fair to assume, as we have, that state demographic and political characteristics have a systematic effect on the adoption of the rules. Most importantly, some cross-state differences, such as participatory culture and norms, are likely correlated with the adoption of election rules and voter turnout (Hanmer 2009 ). Yet, they are unobservable and thus never fully controlled for by a conventional regression model, which results in omitted variable bias. It is hard to deny the possibility that the previous crosssectional studies over-or underestimate the effect of state election rules on the level of turnout among the entire population as well as among subpopulations.
1
In addition to examining predictors of policy adoption, this study seeks to reexamine the effect of voter ID laws on voter turnout across different racial and ethnic groups. To reduce the possibility of omitted variable bias, we exploit temporal variations in the election rules within the states between 1980 and 2010. Many states adopted the new rules over the past two decades, allowing us to compare the level of turnout before and after the implementation of rules within states. As we exploit the temporal changes within states, we can avoid the problem discussed above that is inherent in a cross-state analysis. Accordingly, our design offers more reliable evidence regarding the effect of state election rules on voter turnout. We use a large-scale survey that includes a sizable number of black and Latino respondents, allowing us to obtain a precise estimate of election rules across racial and ethnic groups. Understanding the actual effect of voter ID rules is critical to making statements about whether the United States is characterized by an adherence to egalitarian or hierarchical values. If our findings do show a connection between diversity and the adoption of reforms, but that reforms are unrelated to turnout, then there is less reason for normative concern among egalitarians.
Modeling the Adoption of Voter ID Laws
We rely on a duration modeling approach to assess the relationship between racial context, partisan control, and the hazard of approving a new voter ID law. Our data are drawn from forty-nine states for the period of 1980 to 2011. We chose this period because almost all states approved a voter ID regulation after 1980. Nebraska is omitted from our dataset because of its nonpartisan legislature.
Our dependent variables measure the duration of years until a state approved a new voter ID regulation. We distinguish between two types of voter identification regulations: photo and nonphoto identification requirements. Nonphoto forms of identification can include a utility bill, bank statement, or Social Security card. In states with photo ID or nonphoto ID regulations, voters are required or requested to show their identifications before casting a ballot. Table 1 lists when states adopted photo or nonphoto requirement, if ever. This information was taken from Larocca and Klemanski (2011) and updated by consulting the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
3 The years in parentheses indicate when laws were revised. 4 As of 2011, photo ID laws had been passed in sixteen states and nonphoto ID laws in twenty. The average durations until approval of new photo ID and nonphoto ID regulations since 1980 are 30.5 and 26.8 years, respectively.
5 Note that some of these states have approved but not yet implemented the laws because of legal disputes or other reasons.
As discussed previously, we expect that the time-untilapproval of voter ID regulations is affected by time-varying political and demographic characteristics of states. The political characteristics accounted for include the partisanship of the state governments, mass ideology, and policy diffusion. We create a variable, Republican-unified government, as our primary measure of government partisanship. This variable equals one if the governor and the majority party in the Senate and House are controlled by Republicans and zero otherwise. We hypothesize that Republican-unified government increases the hazard rate of approving a new voter ID law. As a robustness check, we also collapse this variable and create three indicator variables that equal one if the governor is Republican and zero otherwise, one if the majority party of the Senate is Republican and zero otherwise, and one if the majority party of the House is Republican and zero otherwise. Our coding of government partisanship is based on Klarner (2011) . As a measure of mass ideology, we include the updated measure of citizen ideology developed by Berry et al. (1998) . 6 The measure ranges from zero to one hundred, with higher scores denoting a more liberal ideology. To account for the influence of neighboring states (see Karch 2007 for a review), we count the number of adjacent states that adopted a photo ID or nonphoto ID regulation by the end of the previous year.
The demographic characteristics of the states are measured as the percentage of black and Latino residents, percentage of persons over sixty-five years old, logged personal income, the unemployment rate, logged population size, and a dummy variable for southern states. Personal income is reported in constant 1982 dollars. The population data come from the census population estimates and the 2010 decennial census. Personal income per capita is obtained from the State and Local Government Finance Summary Report, compiled by the Census Bureau. The unemployment rate is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 .
For estimation, we use a Weibull model and assume that the hazard rate is increasing over time. This assumption is consistent with the empirical fact that increasing numbers of states have approved new voter ID laws in the past few decades. To relax this assumption and leave the hazard rate unspecified, we also use a Cox proportional hazard model. We can confirm that the results using the Cox model, reported in the appendix (http://prq.sagepub. com/supplemental/), are almost identical with those using the Weibull model. Table 3 presents the results for the approval of photo ID regulations. 7 The unit of analysis is state-year. Observations are dropped after the state approved a new 6
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photo ID regulation in a given year. The coefficient estimates in Table 3 are expressed in terms of the hazard rate. A positive coefficient indicates that the hazard rate increases in value as the covariates increase, implying that the time-until-approval of voter ID regulations is decreasing. In contrast, a negative coefficient implies that the time-until-adoption of voter ID regulations is increasing as the values of the covariates increase. Standard errors are clustered by state.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that a unified Republican government has a positive and statistically significant effect on the hazard rate. The likelihood that a unified Republican government approves a new photo ID law is sixteen times greater than for other types of governments. In column 2, we examine the separate effects of Republican governors, Republican control of the state senate, and Republican control of the state house. The findings are similar to that in column 1: Republican Case 2:13-cv-00193 Document 797-2 Filed in TXSD on 11/20/14 Page 7 of 15 governors and legislatures are more likely to approve the adoption of photo ID laws. The coefficient associated with Republican governors indicates that Republican control of the executive branch has a particularly large effect on approval.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the percentage of blacks and Latinos has no statistically significant relationship with the approval of the photo ID laws. However, we find that racial context does impact election reform efforts when interacted with unified Republican control of state government. Column 3 indicates that the positive relationship between unified Republican control and the hazard rate of adopting a photo ID laws is weakened by the presence of blacks and Latinos.
To facilitate our interpretation of the interaction effect between Republican government and black population size, the top panel of Figure 1 displays the predicted hazard rate of adopting a photo ID law for four different types of scenarios: Republican-controlled government in states with small black populations, Republicancontrolled government in states with large black populations, other government in states with small black populations, and other government in states with large black populations. The values for black population size are set at one standard deviation below the mean (=0.64 percent) and one standard deviation above the mean (=18.92 percent) in our data. The other variables are held at their mean values. The top panel of Figure 1 shows that the predicted hazard rate increases dramatically as time passes when the state government is uniformly controlled by Republicans and the size of the black population is small. In contrast, the predicted hazard rate does not increase much for states under Republican control with large black populations. According to Figure 1 , the predicted hazard rates are distinguishable from each other only at the end of the time period.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the predicted hazard rate of adopting a photo ID law when unified Republican control of state government is interacted with Latino population size. The values for Latino population size are set at one standard deviation below the mean (=0.00 percent) and one standard deviation above the mean (=15.79 percent). The results are very similar to those in the top panel. The predicted hazard rate increases dramatically at the end of the study period only when Republican control occurs in states with few Latinos.
Additionally, Table 3 indicates that public liberalism is negatively associated with the approval of photo ID laws, though the coefficient is statistically significant only at the .10 level. This is consistent with prior research showing a close relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes in the states (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993) . 8 Table 4 reports results concerning the adoption of nonphoto ID laws. The same set of explanatory variables is included in the regression models. In contrast to the results reported in Table 3 , Table 4 suggests that neither partisan nor racial and ethnic variables play an important role in the adoption of nonphoto ID regulations. We find that the hazard rate is higher in the southern states and the states whose neighbors have adopted a nonphoto ID law. 9 Similarly, we find no significant relationship between partisan and racial variables and the adoption of EDR laws, as reported in Table 5 . As of 2011, EDR laws were passed in twelve states. The average durations until the approval of EDR regulations since 1980 are 27.8 years. Column 1 of Table 5 reports that unified Republican control and the percentage of Latinos are negatively associated with the hazard rate of adopting EDR, but the coefficients are significant only at the .10 level. We find no statistically significant coefficient associated with other partisan and racial variables.
In sum, our findings suggest that the presence of minorities works to prevent Republicans from adopting photo ID regulations. Absent large minority populations, Republican governments are more likely to adopt voter identification laws. When minorities are present in sufficient numbers, Republicans governments are dissuaded from pursing such 8
policies. Republicans still seek to pass legislation that is interpreted as running counter to minority interests, but this effect is confined to particular contexts. This result is not consistent with a hierarchical system where minorities are poorly represented in policymaking and where the quality of representation declines in areas with large minority populations. However, the evidence is also not consistent with the value of racial egalitarianism where minority interests are well represented by all parties in all contexts. Instead, it suggests a complex interaction between these traditions in which minority group size acts as a constraint on the existing forces of policy backlash and hierarchy. We used the Weibull model where the hazard rate is set as an outcome. The data include the states between 1980 and 2011 until they approved a new nonphoto ID law. The number of observations is 1,311. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed tests; ρ is tested against the null that the parameter is equal to one).
Modeling the Consequences of Voter ID Laws
We next examine the effects of voter ID laws on minority turnout by regressing the presence/absence of voter ID laws on individual self-reported voting. Our model also includes relevant individual-level demographic variables and state-level political and demographic variables as controls.
All individual-level variables are obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS) November Supplement File. The CPS dataset was chosen for our study because it includes a sizable number of African American and Latino respondents across the states in each cycle of surveys. The CPS, conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is a monthly survey of individuals. It provides a comprehensive body of data on employment status, characteristics of persons in and out of the labor force, and other standard demographic features. In addition, the November Supplement File in the year of a general election includes a question asking respondents about whether they voted. The CPS data used for this paper include between 70,000 and 80,000 observations that are spread across the forty-nine states.
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Our analysis employs the November CPS survey for all of the presidential and nonpresidential election years between 1980 and 2010. The estimation is based on respondents who are over eighteen years old and eligible to vote. The sizes of white, black, and Latino samples are 1,156,409; 115,712; and 67,025, respectively. The outcome variable is equal to one if respondents reported to vote in the November election and zero otherwise. Highton (2005) notes that turnout is reported by another member of a household for about 40 percent of the CPS respondents. Self-reported and proxy-reported voting may cause a measurement error due to misreporting (Highton 2005; Silver, Anderson, and Abramson 1986 ). Yet, recent studies (Karp and Brockington 2005; Katz and Katz 2010) indicate that self-reported and validated voting make no difference in substantive implications of their empirical findings. In addition, we replicated our analysis using the official rate of turnout at the state level and found that the substantive conclusions did not differ. Those who did not report whether they voted or abstained are dropped from our analysis.
Our model controls for the effects of several individual-level demographic variables such as education and income levels, age, sex, and employment status. Education is measured by an indicator that equals one if a respondent has a college degree and zero otherwise. Income is measured by income quartiles that are defined for each survey year. The base category is the first quartile. Age is measured by indicator variables that divide respondents into three groups: "young" people under thirty-five years old, "middle aged" people between thirty-six and sixty-four years old, and "senior" people over sixty-five years old. The baseline category is middle-aged. Sex is an indicator variable that equals one if a respondent is female and zero otherwise. Finally, the employment status is measured by a dichotomous variable that equals one if a respondent is unemployed and zero otherwise.
The individual-level data described above are merged with state-level political and demographic variables. Our primary explanatory variable accounts for the adoption of photo and nonphoto ID laws. It equals 1 if the state has the law in place in a given year and 0 otherwise. Table 1 summarizes the years in which the photo ID and nonphoto ID regulations became effective.
In addition to the voter ID laws, we also include other election reform variables adopted between 1980 and 2010 to minimize the possibility that our estimation is affected by the adoption of other rules. Following the classifications by Larocca and Klemanski (2011, 78-81) , we account for the effects of five areas of state election reforms: Election Day registration, early in-person voting, permanent no-excuse absentee voting, nonpermanent no-excuse absentee voting, and universal mail voting. The definitions of these election rules are summarized in Table 6 . Data on the state election rules come from Fitzgerald (2005) and Larocca and Klemanski (2011) .
We also include all of the state-level variables used in the earlier analysis predicting the approval of voter ID laws, except for the variable measuring policy diffusion.
11 Furthermore, we account for the mobilizing effect of other statewide elections. This is captured by two variables that equal one if a U.S. Senate or gubernatorial election is held in a given year and zero otherwise.
The last two sets of control variables are a state fixed effect and election-year fixed effect. The state fixed effect captures all time-invariant characteristics of the state. Time-invariant characteristics involve stable institutional designs and potentially unobservable norms that could be related to voter turnout and the adoption of election reforms. 12 The election-year fixed effect captures any election-specific shock, such as the effects of election types (i.e., presidential or nonpresidential elections), national economic depression, and any other major events that occurred in a particular election year that might be associated with the state-level political situations and voter turnout. The omission of the election-year fixed effect would cause a bias in our estimates. Table 7 reports the results for the relationship between election reform variables and individual self-reported voting. All standard errors are clustered by state. The state and year fixed effects are included in the model but not displayed in the table. Our primary explanatory variables, photo ID and nonphoto ID laws, have no statistically discernible relationship with the probability that whites, blacks, and Latinos voted in the general elections between 1980 and 2010 except that the nonphoto ID law has a positive and significant relationship with Latino turnout. In short, more stringent ID requirements for voting have no deterring effect on individual turnout across different racial and ethnic groups.
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Table 7 also reveals that other state-level election reforms, including universal mail voting, no-excuse absentee voting, and early in-person voting, have no systematic effect on turnout when racial and ethnic groups are analyzed separately. This does not appear to be true for EDR, which is especially interesting because prior state-level research finds a significant positive effect of EDR on turnout (e.g., Fitzgerald 2005). Table 2 . CPS = Current Population Survey. *p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
Conclusion
Liberal values have and continue to serve aid in the promotion political equality. This tradition has helped break down long-standing barriers faced by racial minorities during the Jim Crow era. Despite such progress, the multiple traditions argument warns that America has not been characterized by a march toward purely democratic ideals. Institutions will, at times, serve to reinforce rather than break down group-based hierarchies. Smith (1993, 550) specifically warns that "novel intellectual, political, and legal systems reinforcing racial, ethnic, and gender inequalities might be rebuilt in America in the years ahead." Over the past decades, several states have enacted legislation establishing or tightening voter identification requirements. Seven states now ask for the presentation of a photo ID to vote. This change represents a departure from a trend toward lowering the costs of voting by making registration less burdensome, establishing lengthy periods of early voting, allowing no-excuse absentee voting, or even allowing voting by mail. Many have pointed to these developments as evidence that the United States remains committed to the preservation of hierarchical pluralism based on ascriptive traits.
This commitment undoubtedly exists for some. However, our first conclusion suggests that the politics of voting rights is more complicated. Patterns of discrimination are less likely to be present when transformative orders supporting egalitarianism are present to protest policies promoting hierarchy. Policy backlash exists, but its effects are confined. Hartz (1955, 14) wrote that a dialectic process characterized American politics, with "evil eliciting the challenge of a conscious good, so that in difficult moments progress is made." Perhaps this is so. But we must remember that the conscious good is not present everywhere.
The political representation of different racial groups is party based (Grose 2011; Hero and Tolber 1995; Preuhs 2006) . This is most true for in states with few minorities, at least when examining the adoption of voter ID laws. Normative concerns also might be lessened by our findings that the effect of photo ID regulation does not vary by race or ethnicity. Public policy sends signals about who government is designed to serve and whose input is most valuable (Schneider and Ingram 1993) . Our null finding is especially noteworthy given this perspective. The passage of these laws has been coupled with attempts by organizations to educate the electorate, mobilize affected groups, and ease the costs associated with complying with these regulations (Holley 2012) . Thus, the lack of a relationship between photo ID requirements and turnout is likely the result of efforts made by what King and Smith (2005) refer to as the egalitarian transformative order. These laws do not originate from this coalition, as noted by the importance of Republican control in our data. This finding suggests contemporary policy debates are consistent with the pattern of dueling orders but that balance of power, at least in this policy area, is with those supporting equality rather than hierarchy.
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Notes
1. In addition, previous studies differ in the way standard errors are computed. Some of the studies ignore the possibility that error terms are correlated temporarily and spatially within the states and, as a result, underestimate the size of standard errors, inflating the level of statistical significance (see Wooldridge 2003). 2. Larocca and Klemanski (2011) further distinguish between regulations that require or request photo or nonphoto identification. Similarly, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) also distinguishes strict and nonstrict requirements. We combine these two types of regulations into a single category to simplify our analysis. 3. The website is found at http://www.ncsl.org/legislatureselections/elections/voter-id.aspx#mo. We accessed the website on January 12, 2013. 4. Several states passed new voter ID laws in 2012. 5. Some states are right-censored. 6. The revised version of the data for the period between 1960 and 2010 is obtained from Richard Fording's website (http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/). 7. We also estimated the models with controls for the percentage of black and Latino state legislatures, which are highly correlated with the percentage of black and Latino residents. The inclusion of these controls did not change our main findings in terms of significant, direction, or substantive effect. The results are available from the authors upon request. 8. We also replicated the models presented in Table 3 with a control for allegations of voter fraud. Data were gathered from the News21 database for the years 2000-2011.
The results show that fraud allegations are unrelated to the adoption of photo ID regulations (p > .05). The models in Tables 3 rely on data from 1980 to 2011. We chose to omit the voter fraud variable in our final analyses rather than lose data from 1980 to 1999. 9. The inability to link Republican control of state government to nonphoto ID laws may be read as further evidence of Republicans' preference for photo-ID laws, as seen in Table 3 .
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10. Nebraska is dropped. 11. In addition, the dummy variable for the South is dropped due to the presence of the state fixed effect in the model. 12. Our research design is similar to those used in several previous studies. Ansolabehere and Konisky (2006) and Burden and Neiheisel (2011) compared the rate of turnout within counties and municipalities before and after a state-level change in registration rules so that they could control for all observable and unobservable variations. Our approach resembles that of Erikson and Minnite (2009) and Hanmer (2009) , although our analysis includes more states and election cycles to improve external validity. In addition, our analysis evaluates the effects of seven different election reforms simultaneously using data compiled by Larocca and Klemanski (2011) . Minnite (2009) and Hanmer (2009) focused on the effect of a single reform. Finally, our analysis differs from Fitzgerald's (2005) in that we consider the possibility that the effects of election reforms vary across subpopulations and from Rigby and Springer (2011) who focus on income bias in voter turnout. 13. As an additional check, we replicated the analysis in Table  7 with an ordinal indictor coded as zero if a state had not adopted an ID regulation, one if a state had adopted a nonphoto ID regulation, and two if a state had adopted a photo ID regulation. Consistent with the results presented, this ordinal indictor had a statistically insignificant relation to turnout among all groups.
